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a b s t r a c t
The Caspian Sea basin holds large quantities of both oil and natural gas that could help meet the
increasing global demand for energy resources. Consequently, the oil and gas potential of the region has
attracted the attention of the international oil and gas industry. The key to realizing the energy
producing potential of the region is the development of transnational export routes to take oil and gas
from the landlocked Caspian Sea basin to world markets. The evaluation and selection of alternative
transnational export routes is a complex multi-criteria problem with conflicting objectives. The
decision makers (DMs) are required to consider a vast amount of information concerning internal
strengths and weaknesses of the alternative routes as well as external opportunities and threats to
them. This paper presents a hybrid model that combines strength, weakness, opportunity and threat
(SWOT) analysis with the Delphi method.
1. Introduction
The oil and natural gas industry is the backbone of the world
economy (Balat, 2010). The rapid economic expansion in devel-
oped countries coupled with the growing economies in countries
such as China and India has precipitated a steady increase in the
demand for energy, especially oil and natural gas (Bambawale and
Sovacool, 2011a,b; Kun et al., 2011). China has moved to the top
spot of energy consumption in 2010 with 20.3% of the global
demand, ahead of the U.S.’s 19%, according to British Petroleum’s
(BP’s) 60th annual statistical review of world energy (2011). The
U.S.’s consumption edged up 3.7% last year compared with an
11.2% growth in China. According to BP, the demand for all forms
of energy grew 5.6% in 2010. The consumption growth acceler-
ated by 3.5% in the organization for economic co-operation and
development (OECD) countries (which includes 34 countries
including the U.S., U.K., France, Germany and Japan) while the
consumption grew by 7.5% in the non-OECD countries. The vital
importance of energy together with the constant increase in
demand for oil and gas necessitates the exploration, development
and distribution of new sources of energy.
The Caspian Sea is the world’s largest inland sea and has a
significant, but not major, amount of oil and natural gas reserves,
based upon estimates by BP Statistical Review of World Energy
(2011). The region’s relative contribution to world supplies of
natural gas is larger than that for oil. The sea is bordered by five
states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia.
Most of the proven energy reserves in the region belongs to
Kazakhstan and is concentrated in the eastern side of the sea. As
shown in Table 1, Azerbaijan possesses both oil and natural gas
reserves while Turkmenistan possesses mostly natural gas. Russia
and Iran hold inconsequential proven reserves in their respective
Caspian sectors.
According to BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011)
shown in Table 2, proven oil reserves for the Caspian Sea region
are estimated at 47.4 billion barrels at the end of 2010 (ranked
8th in world), comparable to those in Libya (46.4 billion barrels).
Natural gas reserves in the Caspian Sea region are even larger
than the region’s oil reserves. Overall, proven natural gas reserves
in the Caspian region are estimated at 11.1 trillion cubic meters at
the end of 2010 (ranked 4th in world), greater than Saudi Arabia
(8.0 trillion cubic meters) and United States (7.7 trillion cubic
meters).
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Despite its modest volumes, Caspian energy has attracted
extensive global policy interest during the past two decades.
The intense international focus on the region is driven by its
geopolitical significance and its unique landlocked location. The
Caspian Sea region is on a major junction between Europe and
Asia and positioned nearby Russia and China. In addition, due to
its landlocked location, the Caspian exporters are dependent on
other states for moving their energy products. The control of the
oil and gas pipelines in the region provides significant influence
over the security and policies of the Caspian states. Thus, the
recent intense interest in the Caspian region and the battle over
the pipeline routes has been more about determining the geos-
trategic orientation of the region and had little to do with the
control of the Caspian states’ modest volumes of oil and gas.
Delimitation of the sea borders has been a contested issue in the
last two decades among the Caspian states. However, legal
disputes have not been an obstacle to the production and export
of oil and gas (Shaffer, 2010). The major obstacles to the devel-
opment of new supplies were not related to underground
resources but what happens above the ground such as interna-
tional relations, governmental affairs and investment in energy
and new technological development (Umbach, 2010).
In spite of the potential for the Caspian states to meet the
increasing global demand for energy resources, only a few
Caspian oil and natural gas export projects have become opera-
tional in the region over the last decade (Shaffer, 2010). Bilgin
(2007, 2010), Guliyev and Akhrarkhodjaeva (2009), Kakachia
(2011), Newnham (2011), Pasquare et al. (2011), Shaffer (2010)
and Umbach (2010) have introduced a large number of factors
that has played a significant role in shaping the Caspian energy
developments. These factors take into consideration political
(Russian influence in the region), economical, social and geologi-
cal issues.
In this study, we identify and quantify a total of 79 factors that
will shape the future of Caspian oil and natural gas export. In
doing so, we propose a hybrid model for evaluating five potential
pipeline routes for transporting the oil and gas from the Caspian
Sea region to the world market. The model integrates strength,
weakness, opportunity and threat (SWOT) analysis with the
Delphi method and captures the DMs’ beliefs through a series of
intuitive and analytical methods. The next section presents the
details of the Delphi-SWOT hybrid paradigm followed by its
application to the gas and oil pipeline evaluation in the Caspian
Sea. The final section presents the conclusions and future research
directions.
2. The Delphi-SWOT hybrid paradigm
Strategy development is a complex and uncertain process that
identifies and evaluates alternatives for utilizing an organization’s
resources to achieve its mission (Li et al., 2002). Because of actual
uncertainty and perceived ambiguity, the process of strategy
development requires input from and cooperation of many
organizational functions and DMs (Li et al., 2000; Mintzberg,
1994a,b; Eden, 1990; Porter, 1987). The hybrid Delphi-SWOT
paradigm proposed in this study is used to identify and evaluate
strategies for locating a pipeline to transport oil and gas from the
Caspian basin to world markets.
The Delphi method was developed at the RAND Corporation to
obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion from a group of
knowledgeable individuals about an issue not subject to objective
solution (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963). It is a structured group
interaction that proceeds through multiple rounds of opinion
collection and anonymous feedback. Although Delphi dates back
to early 1950s, the most recognized description of the method
was offered by Linstone and Turoff (1975). Fischer (1978),
Schmidt (1997), Okoli and Pawloski (2004) and Keeney et al.
(2006) also provide excellent reviews.
Each round in Delphi involves a written survey of the partici-
pants followed by statistical feedback to them for each survey
question. After seeing the results from the previous round, the
participants are asked to reconsider their opinions. Generally,
there is a convergence of opinions after three or four rounds, and
a stabilized group opinion emerges. This group opinion may
reflect agreement, disagreement or some of each. The optimum
number of participants depends on the number needed to have a
representative pooling of views (Ndour et al., 1992).
Since its inception in the early 1950s, SWOT analysis has been
used with increasing success as a strategic planning tool by both
researchers and practitioners (Learned et al., 1965; Panagiotou,
2003). The technique is used to segregate environmental factors
and forces into internal strengths and weaknesses and external
opportunities and threats (Valentin, 2001; Duarte et al., 2006).
The SWOT matrix developed by Weihrich (1982) for situational
analysis is one of the most important references in the field. Even
with its popularity, Novicevic et al. (2004) observe that SWOT is a
conceptual framework with limited prescriptive power. However,
SWOT remains a useful tool for assisting DMs to structure
complex and ill-structured problems (Hitt et al., 2000; Anderson
and Vince, 2002).
3. Delphi-SWOT pipeline planning process
This study was conducted for the Horizon Oil Company,1 a
multinational oil and natural gas producer. The mission of the
company is the exploration, development, production and mar-
keting of crude oil and natural gas. Horizon established a group of
Table 1
Caspian oil and natural gas proved reserves—at end 2010.
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011).
Main producers in
the Caspian Sea
Oil reserves
(billion barrels)
Gas reserves
(trillion cubic meters)
Kazakhstan 39.80 1.80
Azerbaijan 7.00 1.30
Turkmenistan 0.60 8.00
Table 2
Top world countries with oil and natural gas proved reserves—at end 2010.
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2011).
Oil Gas
Country
(region)
Oil reserves
(billion
barrels)
Country (region) Gas reserves
(trillion cubic
meters)
Saudi Arabia 264.5 Russian Federation 44.8
Venezuela 211.2 Iran 29.6
Iran 137.0 Qatar 25.3
Iraq 115.0 Caspian Sea region 11.1
Kuwait 101.5 Saudi Arabia 8.0
United Arab Emirates 97.8 US 7.7
Russian Federation 77.4 United Arab Emirates 6.0
Caspian Sea region 47.4 Venezuela 5.5
Libya 46.4 Nigeria 5.3
1 The name of the company and some details of the study have been changed
to protect the anonymity of the company and the security of strategy.
informed individuals to pool expertise from many domains and
evaluate several alternative routes for transporting Caspian oil
and gas to the world energy markets. The group included five
senior managers and two external facilitators. A common group
decision making activity is evaluating and deciding upon various
alternatives (Ngwenyama and Brysona, 1999). Decision making
bodies in organizations are often formed as groups to evaluate
decision alternatives by collecting and synthesizing information
from different perspectives. Group decision making is an effective
way to overcome judgment errors in organizations due to human
fallibility (Koh, 1994). Maier (2010) summarizes the virtues of
group decision making as follows: first, if every group member
exerts effort to become informed, groups can gather more
information than individual members. Better information can
lead to better decisions. Second, if all group members have the
same information, they may not reach the same conclusion since
group members typically have different backgrounds and experi-
ences. Third, if some information is erroneous, a group can pool
signals and reduce uncertainty. Fourth, groups provide an insur-
ance against extreme preferences of individual DMs. The key
duties and responsibilities of the group at Horizon included the
following:
(a) Identifying and selecting the most preferable route for trans-
porting Caspian oil and gas.
(b) Overseeing all phases of the evaluation process.
(c) Resolving conflicts as they arise.
(d) Developing an action plan for the selected route.
(e) Obtaining the approval of the top management in the imple-
mentation of the action plan.
The five senior managers were highly educated. Three man-
agers held graduate degrees in engineering, one held a graduate
degree in economics and one held a graduate degree in manage-
ment. Although the members of the group were educated, their
managerial judgment and intuition were limited by their back-
ground and experience. Nevertheless, all five group members
were veteran mangers with 15–43 years of experience in the oil
and gas industry. The fact that the group members held different
kinds of knowledge made it more likely that all aspects of the
decision will come under consideration. In addition, the group
also relied on 27 researchers and experts at Horizon who
conducted research interviews and collected data over the course
of two years from different stakeholders involved in oil and
natural gas exploration, production, transmission and distribu-
tion. Fig. 1 presents the hybrid Delphi-SWOT paradigm used in
this study and the involved actors. The process included six steps
using Delphi rounds to get a consensus and SWOT analysis to
develop the final strategy.
3.1. Step 1—group identification of the alternatives
The process began with the participants meeting to discuss the
alternative oil and gas pipeline routes proposed by the team of 27
researchers and experts at Horizon who had collected data and
conducted feasibility study for the following nine potential routes
in the Caspian Sea region:
 Western route (W).
 Northern route (N).
 Southern route (S).
 Eastern route (E).
 Southeastern route (SE).
 Northwestern route (via Azerbaijan, Russia and Black sea)
(NW).
 Western route (via Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey) (W2).
 Southeastern route (via Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan) (SE2).
 Eastern route (via Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan) (E2).
The five senior managers and the team of 27 researchers decided
to identify those alternative routes that could be eliminated from
further consideration through logical dominance. They agreed to use
the following rule for dominance: if alternative route A is better than
alternative route B on some objectives and no worse than B on all
other objectives, B can be eliminated from consideration. In such
cases, B is said to be logically dominated by A (Hammond et al.,
1998). Following this agreement, the senior managers and the
researchers participated in several rounds of Delphi and discussed
the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative route. In each
round of Delphi, the senior managers and the experts evaluated the
alternative routes and after each round two facilitators provided an
anonymous summary of the group’s judgments from the previous
round as well as the reasons they provided for their judgments. The
participants were then encouraged to revise their earlier judgments
in light of the responses of other members of the group. In the first
round of Delphi, the northern route (N) dominated the northwestern
route (via Azerbaijan, Russia and Black sea) (NW) (N4NW) mainly
because of the war in Georgia, which posed some risks associated
with the NW alternative. In round 2, the western route
(W) dominated the western route (via Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Turkey) (W2) (W4W2) mainly because of the strained Armenian–
Turkish relations over a number of historical and political issues
Fig. 1. Hybrid Delphi-SWOT process.
including the Nagarno–Karabakh War. In the third round of Delphi,
the southern route dominated the southeastern route (S4SE2) and
in the fourth and final round, the eastern route dominated the
eastern route via Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan
(E4E2) because of ethnic conflict between these countries. Conse-
quently, the NW, W2, SE2 and E2 routes were eliminated from
further consideration and a consensus emerged to include the W, N,
S, E and SE routes in the SWOT analysis. A detailed mathematical
description of the dominance concept is presented in Appendix 1. As
for the viability of the five alternative routes, the initial route
selection came from Horizon Company and the research team
supporting the decision-making process; nevertheless, these five
alternatives are widely proposed or discussed in the literature on oil
and gas pipeline planning in the Caspian Sea basin as shown below:
 Western route (W): Akdemir (2011, p. 73), Babali (2009,
p. 1300), Balat (2010, p. 1999), Bilgin (2007, p. 6384), Guliyev
and Akhrarkhodjaeva (2009, p. 3174), Mavrakis et al. (2006,
p. 1675), Pasquare et al. (2011, p. 1774), Shaffer (2010, p. 7211)
and Sovacool et al. (2011, p. 611).
 Northern route (N): Newnham (2011, p. 137), SO¨derbergh et al.
(2010, p. 7830) and Stegen (2011, p. 6508).
 Southern route (S): Akdemir (2011, p. 73), Babali (2009,
p. 1300), Bilgin (2009, p. 4488), Kaiser and Pulsipher (2007,
p. 1309) and Kakachia (2011, p. 18).
 Eastern route (E): Akdemir (2011, p. 73), Babali (2009, p. 1300)
and Shaffer (2010, p. 7211).
 Southeastern route (SE): Akdemir (2011, p. 73) and Babali
(2009, p. 1300).
Fig. 2 presents the five alternative transportation routes and
the main extraction zones for oil and gas in the Caspian Sea region
considered in this study.
Horizon intended to use four general zones shown in Fig. 2 for oil
and gas extraction. The plan was to use separate but parallel oil and
gas pipelines, similar to the parallel Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline
and the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzerum South Caucasian natural gas pipeline,
traversing the same route through the Republic of Georgia (Pasquare
et al., 2011). Next, we discuss the five alternatives routes formulated
in Step 1.
3.1.1. Alternative 1—western route (W)
The Caucasus region is between the Black Sea on the west and
the Caspian Sea on the east, and it comprises the newly indepen-
dent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These three
countries have been included in the European Union (EU) Neigh-
borhood Policy since 2004 (Kalyuzhnova, 2005). Although the
region has been plagued by conflict, it is an important transit area
for oil and gas exports from the Caspian Sea to European and
world energy markets (Energy Information Administration, 2006).
Much of the production of Caspian region will come from the
Baku region of Azerbaijan, in particular from the giant Azeri–
Chirag–Gunashli (ACG) oil field that lies about 100 km off the
coast of Baku, with about 5.4 billion barrels of recoverable
petroleum (Pasquare et al., 2011). Azerbaijan has been embroiled
in a conflict with Armenia, centered over control of the Nagorno–
Karabagh region, and resolution of this conflict has been a major
feature of the state’s national security and foreign policies since
its independence (Shaffer, 2010).
Three independent pipelines have been proposed to pass
through Georgia: the Baku–Supsa and Baku–Ceyhan crude oil
pipelines and the Southern Caucasus natural gas pipeline from
Baku to Tbilisi and Erzerum, and in 2005, the Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan pipeline became operational (Shaffer, 2010). While the
US consistently has supported the principle of multiple export
Fig. 2. Alternative transportation routes and the main oil and gas extraction zones.
options for Caspian energy resources, the Baku–Ceyhan route
through Turkey has significant advantages. The port of Cayman is
on the Mediterranean and can accommodate very large tankers
while Supsa, Georgia and Novorossiysk, Russia are restricted to
smaller LR-2 tankers that can transit the Bosporus. Politically, the
Baku–Ceyhan route is consistent with US and Turkish efforts to
minimize Russian and Iranian control over energy export routes
(Sovacool, 2011). The existing Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum gas pipeline
between Azerbaijan and Turkey might be extended to Europe by
the Nabucco Project, which is intended to distribute Caspian and
Middle Eastern gas in Europe. Nabucco needs additional suppliers
because Azerbaijan can supply only half of the amount needed for
its feasibility (Bilgin, 2007, 2009). There are environmental and
security issues related to these routes. For example, the Georgian
government has concerns that the planned routes for Baku–
Ceyhan and southern Caucasus pipelines traverse the Borjomi
Valley, the source of Georgia’s renowned mineral water. Subse-
quently, the routes were adjusted to bypass the valley. In addi-
tion, civil instability in Georgia and the hostilities between
Azerbaijan and Armenia have spurred Georgia and the US to
create a special military unit for pipeline protection.
The August 2008 Russian invasion of the Georgia and the
unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia fundamentally changed the landscape of the region. The war
in Georgia demonstrated some risks associated with the transit
energy corridor in the southern Caucasus. It also confirmed the need
for broader security guarantees for a region that is vital to the global
energy security (Kakachia, 2011). Furthermore, in search of an
alternative route, BP switched to the recently reopened western
route export pipeline, known as the Baku–Supsa line. Because of the
deteriorating military conflict, BP has also suspended shipments
through Baku–Supsa, as well as the South Caucasus Pipeline, which
transports natural gas from Baku to Turkey through Tbilisi. Com-
pleting the lock-in of Azeri oil exports, the fighting caused autho-
rities to suspend seaborne shipments from Georgia’s Black Sea port
of Batumi and Poti, both supplied by rail. Poti has now been closed
following reported Russian airstrikes. Adding to the gloomy picture,
authorities also ceased exports from Kulevi, Georgia’s third Black Sea
oil terminus. The five-day clash has put a serious dent in Georgia’s
economy both in causalities and in deteriorating the prospects for
development and investment (Kakachia, 2011). To make a bad
situation worse, Pasquare et al. (2011), have identified new seismic
and volcanic risks threatening the strategic Caspian oil and gas
pipelines through the Republic of Georgia.
Turkey is planning to increase its oil and gas pipeline infra-
structure to accommodate its increased energy demand (Kilic- ,
2006). Turkey and the United State are strategic partners. Azer-
baijan supports Turkey for cultural and political reasons and
Georgia sees Turkey as a crucial partner in its efforts to join the
EU and NATO. Nevertheless, Turkey is dependent on Russia, which
supplies about two-thirds of its natural gas. The Bosporus is a
viable option for transporting natural gas. However, safety,
security and environmental considerations weaken the feasibility
of this alternative and Turkey rejects this route because of the
congestion in the straights (C- etin and Oguz, 2007). Turkey is one
of the major oil and gas importers for its own consumption
(Soyhan, 2009; Balat, 2010).
Turkey controls both a sea route, the narrows between Europe
and Asia, and overland routes to the Mediterranean. While much
of Central Asia’s energy resources will continue to move through
Russia’s pipelines to the Black Sea and the Turkish outlet, some
will soon flow through lines westward from the Caspian and
across Turkey to terminals on its Mediterranean shores. Healthy
competition among the interested powers for Central Asia’s oil and
gas concessions and pipeline infrastructure is to be welcomed.
However, competition that deteriorates into heavy-handed
military pressures to gain political positions spells disaster. This
type of negative competition may lead to conflict, as outside
powers set one Central Asian state against another, or encourage
separatist uprisings and domestic coups. Such fragmentation from
the combination of external pressures and internal regional divi-
sions would convert Central Asia into the kind of Shatterbelt that
has characterized the Middle East since the end of World War I.
The alternative for the world’s major powers is to collaborate in
developing Central Asia by treating it as a Gateway region. The EU
is best positioned to lead such a collaborative effort, and Turkey’s
membership in the Union would enhance its capacity to do so.
Ankara can reach out to that part of the Muslimworld once known
as Turkestan because of their traditional influence based on
linguistic, religious and racial ties. In addition, Turkey could help
stabilize the Middle East by directing unused fresh waters from
rivers such as the Seyhan and Ceyhan that now discharge into the
Mediterranean, through a ‘‘Peace Pipeline’’ to the Levant and the
Arabian Peninsula, which Turkish leaders first proposed two
decades ago (Akdemir, 2011). Turkey is no longer viewed by the
states of the region as a state working in the region in synchro-
nization with Washington. In addition, Baku and Tbilisi are much
more reserved in their views on sharing strategic partnership with
Ankara in the region (Shaffer, 2010).
3.1.2. Alternative 2—northern route (N)
Russia dominates the northern sector of the Caspian region,
occupying 30% of the shoreline (Correlje´ and van der Linde, 2006).
Russia’s existing national oil trunk pipeline network is a unique
technological system and the primacy of Russian gas in the global
arena is absolute (Akdemir, 2011; Fernandez, 2009; Fernandez and
Palazuelos, 2011). Russia is the principal heir to the Soviet gas
industry that was developed at a rapid pace between 1955 and
1990. According to the BP Statistical Review (2011), Russia has 23.9%
of the world’s total gas reserves, and Russian production equals
18.4% of global production. About 30% of the Russian gas production
is exported (So¨derbergh et al., 2010). While all the Soviet oil and gas
pipelines transit Russia, the Russian influence is more complicated
than their geographical paths. Consequently, Russian policy fre-
quently has been determined primarily by geopolitical rather than
economic considerations. For instance, the Russian pipeline system
is no longer capable of transporting the growing oil and gas
production from the region (Bahgat, 2007), and Russia’s economic
difficulties prevent its development of an adequate infrastructure.
In addition to these geographical and political factors, Russian
influence in the region is supported by its potent military
presence, the strongest of any littoral state (Correlje´ and van
der Linde, 2006). Almost 90% of Russia’s gas exports now transit
Ukraine (Akdemir, 2011). During the last few years, Russians have
experienced difficulties exporting gas during the winter season.
Recent irregularities in gas supply to Turkey again led Russia to
blame Ukraine for lack of reliability in its transit responsibilities.
Russia is often willing to sacrifice economic gain to assert political
advantage (Orttung and Overland, 2011; Bilgin, 2009). Stegen
(2011) describes this Russia tool’s as an ‘‘energy weapon’’.
Russia’s new energy weapon is of great importance today because
Russia is likely to gain more and more power as oil and gas
become scarcer in the future (Newnham, 2011). Russia’s need to
export its oil and gas to the European market has led to mutual
dependence that precludes the instrumentalisation of Russian
energy and pipeline policy as a factor of foreign policy in the age
of globalization (Umbach, 2010).
3.1.3. Alternative 3—southern route (S)
Iran possesses the world’s second largest natural gas reserves
and occupies a strategic location between the oil-rich region of
the Middle East and the southern Caspian Sea (Pak and
Farajzadeh, 2007). While there are prospects for significant gas
reserves in the Caspian region, Iran’s largest reserves are in the
South Pars located in the Persian Gulf (Mavrakis et al., 2006). In
spite of the increase in the natural gas production, Iran is often an
importer of its natural gas needs due to higher consumption rate
(Mazandarani et al., 2011). Similarly, Iran’s oil deposits in the
Caspian basin are largely unexplored and underdeveloped
(Shaffer, 2010). Furthermore, Iran has access to open seas and
world energy markets through the Persian Gulf and the Straits of
Hormuz, which lead to the Oman Sea and the Indian Ocean (Pak
and Farajzadeh, 2007). Iran interest in the Caspian region is
shaped by several considerations. Providing security for its north-
ern border is vital and requires stability in the contiguous Central
Asian states. In addition, developing favorable relations with
these countries is seen as a means of normalizing relations with
the EU, China and Japan. Also, maintaining good relations with
Russia and Turkey is essential. Russia is Iran’s primary source of
military equipment and technology while Iran aims to sell its
natural gas to Europe through Turkey’s pipeline system (Kja¨rstad
and Johansson, 2007).
Because of this geography factor, Iran dominates the southern
route from the Caspian region. Although Iran has an advantageous
geographic location and significant energy resources, several
interacting conditions have circumscribed its influence in the
region and limited the realization of its energy and transit
potential. First, Iran itself lacks the resources to develop its energy
and transit infrastructure. Second, US efforts to isolate Iran have
been a deterrent to foreign investment.
Tehran asserts that routes through Iran to the Persian Gulf are
the shortest and most economical for exporting oil from the
Caspian Sea. Furthermore, the Persian Gulf routes could transport
oil to Asia, where the demand is projected to grow faster and
would support a higher price than the Mediterranean markets that
most of the competing pipelines serve. Oil could be exported via
Iran either by direct transportation pipelines that pass through
Iran to the Persian Gulf or by oil swaps. However, investment in
Iran’s oil sector would be limited by US economic sanctions.
3.1.4. Alternative 4—eastern route (E)
The Central Asian Republics (CARS) include Kazakhstan, Uzbe-
kistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan possess few fossil fuel deposits, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
have substantial energy reserves. None of the CARS has direct
access to open sea routes; however, they are strategically located
between Russia, China, Iran and Turkey. Because of this geology
and geography, the EU, US and Japan in addition to China and
Russia have revealed intense interest in the region (Dorian, 2006).
Kazakhstan is energy rich, the third largest energy-producing
country of the former Soviet Union, and the only one of the CARS
bordering the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan also has abundant energy
resources with 60% of its land area showing oil and gas potential
(Finon and Locatelli, 2008). Kazakhstan has emerged as the main
recipient of oil and gas investment in the Caspian region, because
of the discovery of the fifth largest ever found oil field in the
world at the offshore Kashagan field (Babli, 2009).
Although Central Asia enjoys vast energy development poten-
tial, there are significant obstacles to exploiting these resources,
such as the limited infrastructure for transporting energy, poor
communications infrastructure, unstable government structures,
political conflict, payments difficulties and inadequate energy
policies (Dorian et al., 1999). However, transportation is a major
constraint for the CARS (Dahl and Kuralbayeva, 2001). A northern
route through Russia is limited by transit quotas. Exports west-
ward through the Caspian and Black Sea are restricted by terminal
capacity. Southward via swaps with Iran is restrained by US
economic and political pressure. To the East, China has a large
3700 km border with the CARS, and its large, rapidly growing
economy has created an increasing demand for energy (Dorian,
2006).
China, the world’s second-largest economy, is worried about
energy security, which underpins the core objectives of Beijing
and the political legitimacy of the Communist Party. Oil is the
second most prominent fuel in China’s energy mix after coal, but
production has not kept up with the rising demand and China
now imports half of its crude oil. This situation shows no signs of
abating, because rising incomes in China will likely lead to further
increases in demand. The usage of natural gas is also growing in
China, especially within the residential sector, and it now repre-
sents 3% of China’s total primary energy supply (Bambawale and
Sovacool, 2011a). On the supply side, the Kazakhstan–China oil
pipeline, currently China’s only cross-country oil pipeline has not
been able to secure enough crude in Kazakhstan to exhaust the
pipe’s capacity as competition for oil in Kazakhstan is fierce. Even
if the pipeline can deliver enough crude oil to China each year, the
amount of oil transported accounts for about 12–13% of the
annual demand and less in the future (Leung, 2011).
3.1.5. Alternative 5—southeastern route (SE)
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan had signed a memor-
andum of understanding to build the Central Asian Oil Pipeline to
transport oil to Pakistan and world markets via Afghanistan.
However, no progress was made on the pipeline because of the
instability in Afghanistan. The death of Osama bin Laden could
have a number of short and long-term effects on the stability and
security of the oil and gas production and transportation in the
Caspian region. The implications for the oil market are unclear.
Nevertheless, this event could weaken the terrorist threat in the
region and underscore the effectiveness of U.S. covert operations
or it could spawn a wave of poorly planned but destructive
terrorist attacks.
Turkmenistan ranks third in the Caspian region in liquid and
gaseous hydrocarbons (Dorian, 2006). However, it has made less
progress than other littoral states in developing its energy
resources because of transportation bottlenecks (Kaliyva, 2004).
Turkmenistan lacks direct access to global waterways. For this
reason, a number of pipelines have been proposed to transport
Turkmenistan’s oil and gas westward through Azerbaijan or Iran.
These routes connect with existing pipeline systems to deliver
product to Turkey and world markets.
An alternative export route for Turkmenistan energy resources
is through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Pakistan has a fast growing
economy and has a strategic location. On its southern side, it has a
long coastline on the Oman Sea with two deep water ports,
Karachi and Gwadar. On its east and northeast, it borders the
economic giants of India and China. Furthermore, Pakistan has
well-developed road and railroad networks that link to India
and China.
Similarly, India is also investing in international pipeline net-
works to guarantee secure supplies of oil and gas. India is
planning to reduce its energy dependence from the Middle East-
ern countries and use the Central Asia countries as its long-term
alternative energy supply (Bambawale and Sovacool, 2011b;
Pandian, 2005).
While Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan share a histor-
ical and cultural heritage, political instability and terrorism
threaten the development of the route. However, the US, the EU
and China are major actors in the region supporting Pakistan as an
international trade corridor. The energy security of Pakistan is
complicated by global and regional geopolitical interests because
of its unique geographical location, its potential to influence the
Muslim world, and its relations with the US, EU and China. During
and after the cold war, Pakistan has been a part of the major
international moves that have shaped the world in general and
Asia in particular. It is likely to remain an important geo-political
actor of the region in the foreseeable future as well. Pakistan is a
fast growing economy that has a very important strategic location
with respect to the energy rich Persian Gulf and Central Asia
(Sahir and Qureshi, 2007).
Most of the proposed pipelines must pass through or near
politically troubled areas. This has raised concerns that some
pipelines could become vulnerable targets for terrorist activity.
The existence of multiple routes would increase the energy
security of both exporters and importers by making export less
subject to technical or political disruptions on any one route.
However, energy security must be balanced by economic feasi-
bility because a larger number of pipelines would mean smaller
economies of scale and greater expenses for each project (Priddle,
1998).
Once the alternative routes were formulated, the process
proceeded to Step 2.
3.2. Step 2—group identification of the relevant issues
As in Step 1, the DMs began their discussion of the issues
relevant to selecting a pipeline route in face-to-face brainstorm-
ing sessions. Based on these discussions, the DMs collectively
decided to consider the following issues when identifying the
relevant factors for the SWOT analysis.
Economic issues. Building an oil or gas pipeline is fundamen-
tally a business proposition. Therefore, return on investment
(ROI) is a primary decision variable. While ROI is a principal
factor in the selection of a pipeline route, it is affected by other
factors including cultural, environmental, geographical, legal,
political, social and technological issues. For example, some
proposals would construct a portion of the pipeline under the
Caspian seabed. This impacts the ROI by exacerbating environ-
mental and legal problems as well as technological obstacles.
A plan for a pipeline transiting the Caspian would invoke the
Caspian Environmental Program (CEP) and involve all the littoral
states in evaluating the environmental risks. In addition, the
technologies required to build a seabed pipeline would be
difficult and costly to transport to the landlocked Caspian. All
these factors would significantly alter the ROI of a seabed route.
For other routes, political factors would impact the risk
inherent in estimating the ROI because the transport countries
are not friendly or terrorist groups operate within their borders.
In some cases, ancient cultural and religious discord is prevalent.
These factors can interact to increase the costs and risks asso-
ciated with a project. Consequently, ROI is truly a socioeconomic
variable in the decision to choose a pipeline route.
Political issues. During the Soviet era, the Caspian region was
dominated by the USSR with Moscow controlling regional activ-
ities including energy exploration, development and transit. The
disintegration of the Soviet Union has fundamentally changed the
geopolitical conditions around the Caspian basin. New regional
and global actors have emerged asserting their own particular
interests. Kaliyva (2004) had identified three primary interest
groups: the Caspian basin states, the transit countries and global
and regional powers.
The Caspian basin states include Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Russia and Turkmenistan as well as Uzbekistan because it shares
several of the regions hydrocarbon basins. These countries are
interested in the development of their rich energy resources and
in exporting them to world markets. Kalyuzhnova (2008) suggests
that the exploration of oil and gas in the Caspian Sea region has
had important impacts on the economic growth and the poverty
alleviation in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. She
predicts that these countries’ financial situation may improve
even further with the discovery and development of new energy
fields and the signing of new production sharing agreements
between governments and international oil and gas companies.
However, she cautions that transparency and accountability on
the management of energy resources is needed for maximizing
the economic and financial benefits of oil and gas for future
generations. She also argues that all policies should seek to
restore the deterioration of environmental conditions in the
Caspian Sea and support sustainable growth.
Transit states include Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria,
Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These
countries seek to benefit from their geographic location between
the Caspian oil and gas fields and world markets by promoting
pipelines that transit their territories. Global and regional powers
with economic and strategic interests in the Caspian region
include Russia, the EU, the US, China, India, Pakistan, Iran and
Turkey. These countries strive to strengthen their positions as a
platform for promoting their global or regional strategies (Kaliyva,
2004).
These competing economic and national interests make the
region the most dangerous and geopolitically complicated area in
the world. Consequently, the critical challenge is to maintain
stability and security in the region. The concerns range from
environmental accidents to political instability and terrorism.
Since the September 11 attacks, the US and the EU have made
energy security a priority and have committed enormous
amounts of resources to this effort (Sahir and Qureshi, 2007). It
is also a major concern for the large and growing Asian economies
of China, Japan, India and South Korea (Bahgat, 2007).
In April 2010, the Council on Foreign Relations convened a
group of experts to discuss the current state of energy security
research. They described the need for systematic analysis of the
relationship between oil and gas supply and political decision
making (Levi, 2010). The Russian control of Georgia could
strengthen its energy monopoly over Europe and isolate Azerbai-
jan and Central Asian countries (Bilgin, 2009; Kakachia, 2011;
Stegen, 2011).
Legal issues. A large portion of the oil and gas reserves in the
Caspian basin is under the seabed. The question of ownership of
these resources is disputed and debated by the Caspian littoral
states. One of the main problems is the lack of law and law
enforcement to define and protect the interests of littoral states.
The seemingly irresolvable status of the Caspian Sea leads to a
set of legal issues. One can conclude that the Caspian is both a sea
and a lake or neither a sea nor a lake. Azerbaijan, which initially
insisted that the Caspian is a sea and must function under the
United Nations (UN) Law of the Sea, has profited by the Caspian’s
uncertain status as a lake on its surface, and a sea underneath.
Russia has achieved some of its goals including the control of the
surface waters, and consequently is rushing to catch up to
Azerbaijan in its capacity to exploit petroleum resources. In the
meantime, Iran insists that the Caspian is a lake and must be
divided according to terms of the Soviet–Iran Treaties. However,
Iranians find themselves excluded from both the seabed and most
of the surface resources by the legal vacuum they have created by
their intransigence. Ultimately, until the Caspian is brought fully
under the control of the international rule of law, these outcomes
will remain imperiled by changing circumstances (Zimnitskaya
and Geldern, 2011).
Environmental issues. Economic activity in the Caspian region is
fundamentally linked to energy exploration, development and
export. The oil and gas industry has been the cause of severe air
pollution as well as soil and water contamination. The problems
began in the Soviet period when the resources were exploited
using environmentally unsound practices. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the situation became worse because of the lack
of cooperation among the Caspian states. Furthermore, the
pollutants are accumulating because they are trapped within this
land-locked basin. This exacerbates the threat to farming, fishing
and the health of the human population.
The solution to this complex environmental crisis requires
creating a legal framework that insures a regional approach to
environmental management and sustainable development. The
CEP was established in 1995 with the support of the World Bank,
the EU, the UN Development Program and the UN Environment
Program. The CEP is a regional intergovernmental organization
that has been instrumental in improving dialog between the
Caspian states and drafting regional agreements on environmen-
tal issues. In particular, the CEP sponsored a series of intergovern-
mental meetings that has produced a Framework Convention for
the Protection of the Caspian Sea (De Mora and Turner, 2004).
This convention is a major step in creating a permanent regional
management structure for the Caspian. While the Caspian Sea
region is not yet a successful model of intergovernmental colla-
boration on environmental management and sustainable growth,
the discussions produced by the CEP have resulted in a broader
awareness and a better understanding of what is at stake.
The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku–Tbilisi–
Erzerum South Caucasian natural gas pipelines are parallel pipelines
traversing the same route through the Republic of Georgia. The
pipelines lie within the northern part of the Javakheti recent
volcanic province. The primary environmental concern in Georgia
is the world-famous natural spring water called the Borjomi
areaiver, which would cut off community water supplies and have
severe ecological impacts between the spill site and the river
(Pasquare et al., 2011). In addition, the world’s attention is attracted
to the Caspian by regional rivalries over the highly competitive
issues of oil extraction, transportation and profit sharing and
occasionally by ethnic tensions. However, there is another, equally
important, danger about which politicians and oil-interests gener-
ally remain silent, namely the destruction of the Caspian Sea’s
unique ecosystem. This is due to a lack of respect for overall regional
development and the former Soviet Union’s long-term violation of
generally accepted environmental norms. The Caspian governments
including Kazakhstan optimistically hope that they can have a
balanced ecosystem and lots of oil (Babali, 2009).
Cultural and social issues. The Caspian Sea basin is located at
the fault line of three clashing civilizations (Huntington, 1993). It
is in this region that the Russian Orthodox, Islamic and Hindu
world views confront each other resulting in a diversity of
customs, languages and sects. These cultures frequently spawn
closed societies that resist change and resent outsiders. Conse-
quently, any project as massive and geographically lengthy as a
pipeline could transit regions occupied by groups such as these
and would likely meet aggressive opposition.
During the Soviet era, Moscow imposed a totalitarian regime
that suppressed these cultures and forced order. The dissolution
of the Soviet Union removed political, economic and military
restraints. This has released diverse social and religious forces
that generate friction if not outright conflict. For example, Tajiki-
stan is a collection of valleys that was forced into a country under
Stalin. This absence of national identity makes the country
vulnerable to transnational criminal organizations that are
involved in opium production and heroin distribution.
Similarly, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a fundamen-
talist sect that utilizes guerrilla tactics and heroin trafficking to
create chaos and undermine the Tashkent government. The
group’s stated goal is the creation of an Islamic state in the
Fergana Valley. These circumstances are pandemic in Caspian
region and CARS. They present severe threats to any attempt to
construct an export pipeline.
Geographical and technological issues. Much of the Caspian
basin energy reserves are located under the seabed or far from
potential markets in relatively remote Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan. The geographical location of these reserves
makes transport a major problem. The Caspian is landlocked so
shipping directly by tanker is not possible. All export of energy
resources from the Caspian states involves extensive pipelines.
One of the pipeline routes is proposed to transit the Caspian
seabed. Constructing this pipeline would require bringing highly
specialized underwater excavating equipment into the region.
Transporting this massive machinery overland would be difficult,
costly and risky. Other proposed routes cross very difficult
topography. Land routes to the east, south and west all encounter
mountainous terrain at some point. They also confront extreme
meteorological conditions that are challenging for people, equip-
ment and the pipeline.
3.3. Step 3—Delphi rounds for synthesizing the relevant factors
This step involved a series of Delphi rounds to develop a set of
relevant factors for use in the SWOT analysis. In the first Delphi
round, the DMs were asked individually to consider the economic,
political, legal, environmental, cultural and social, geographical
and technological issues discussed in Step 2 and to compile a set
of factors considered to be important in the pipeline decision.
These personal lists were provided to the facilitators anon-
ymously. Then, the facilitators combined all of these factors into
a list with 478 factors.
In round 2, this list was shared with all the DMs. They were
asked to consider this feedback and then revise and resubmit
their initial individual list. The facilitators combined all of these
factors into a new list with 242 factors. Again in round 3, the
synthesized list of factors from round 2 was shared with all the
DMs, and they were asked to revise and resubmit their individual
list from round 2. The facilitators then combined all of these
factors into another new list with 112 factors. These Delphi
rounds were repeated three more times. In round 4, the
facilitators synthesized a list of 79 factors. At this point,
the DMs agreed that they could not make significant changes
to the list. Consequently, a decision was made to use the
79 factors presented in Tables 3(a) and (b) in the subsequent
steps.
3.4. Step 4—group classification of the synthesized factors
The DMs collectively classified the 79 factors developed in
Step 3 into economic, political, legal, environmental, cultural and
social, geographical and technological categories. While 22 factors
were identified as economic concerns, only four factors were
perceived as legal issues.
3.5. Step 5—SWOT formulation and analysis
Within the categories identified in Step 4, the DMs collectively
classified each factor as either external or internal. Next, the DMs
collectively categorized external factors into opportunities and
threats and internal factors into strengths and weaknesses. Of the
79 factors presented in Table 3, 47 were classified as external and
32 were categorized as internal. Within the external factors, 19
were perceived as opportunities and 28 as threats. Within the
internal factors, 16 were identified as strengths and 16 as
weaknesses. The balance of factors between external and internal
and threats and opportunities suggest a defensive position in
reaction to external threats rather than an offensive orientation in
the SWOT analysis.
Table 3
Group classification of the synthesized factors.
Factor Sub-factor SWOT
(a)
Economical (22)
ECN01 Financial support of the international community Opportunity
ECN02 Availability of investment tax credits for oil and gas explorations in the region countries Opportunity
ECN03 High ROI potentials Opportunity
ECN04 Financial support of the region/pipeline countries for oil and gas explorations Opportunity
ECN05 Availability of cheap labor in the region/pipeline countries Opportunity
ECN06 High level of export in the region/pipeline countries Opportunity
ECN07 Potential for high and stable energy demand in the region/pipeline countries Opportunity
ECN08 High level of GDP in the region/pipeline countries Opportunity
ECN09 High tax rate in the region/pipeline countries Threat
ECN10 High cost of building and maintaining pipelines in the region/pipeline countries Threat
ECN11 High level of tariffs and commissions in the region/pipeline countries Threat
ECN12 High cost of oil and gas transportation and transfer in the region/pipeline countries Threat
ECN13 High oil and gas drilling and exploration expenses in the region/pipeline countries Threat
ECN14 Negative effect of pipelines on other industries such as tourism and fishing Threat
ECN15 Economic dependency of the region/pipeline countries to other countries Threat
ECN16 Investment security in the region/pipeline countries Strength
ECN17 Qualified and productive labor force in the region/pipeline countries Strength
ECN18 Economic stability of the region/pipeline countries Strength
ECN19 High current oil and gas supply Strength
ECN20 Low non-oil and gas import/export level in the region/pipeline countries Weakness
ECN21 Poor oil and gas quality Weakness
ECN22 Poor forecast for oil and gas supply Weakness
Political (9)
POL01 Political support of the neighboring countries for the project Opportunity
POL02 Political support of the international community for the project Opportunity
POL03 Possibility of Russian control of the pipeline Threat
POL04 Danger of terrorism in the region/pipeline countries Threat
POL05 Nuclear proliferation initiatives in the region/pipeline countries Threat
POL06 Foreign oil and gas dependency of the region/pipeline countries Threat
POL07 Political stability of the region/pipeline countries Strength
POL08 Poor security in the region/pipeline countries Weakness
POL09 Military instability of the region/pipeline countries Weakness
Legal (4)
LEG01 Oil and gas reserve ownership disputes in the region/pipeline countries Threat
LEG02 Availability and stability of insurance industry in the region/pipeline countries Strength
LEG03 Strict import/export laws and regulations in the region/pipeline countries Weakness
LEG04 Strict foreign investment rules and regulations in the region/pipeline countries Weakness
(b)
Environmental (8)
ENI01 Pollution of the sea surface Threat
ENI02 Pollution of the sea bottom Threat
ENI03 Pollution of the beaches Threat
ENI04 Pollution of the water sources Threat
ENI05 Pollution of the water destinations Threat
ENI06 Pollution of the rivers and water canals Threat
ENI07 Pollution caused by nuclear activities Threat
ENI08 Availability of underground water sources along the route Threat
Technological (11)
TEC01 Ability to maintain and repair current pipelines Opportunity
TEC02 Ability to expand current pipelines Opportunity
TEC03 Ability to convert natural gas to liquid gas Opportunity
TEC04 Adequacy of technologically advanced oil and gas tankers Strength
TEC05 Adequacy of technologically advanced oil and gas trucks Strength
TEC06 Adequacy of the oil and gas refineries Strength
TEC07 Adequacy of the railroad infrastructure Strength
TEC08 Lack of scientific and technological foundation of the society Weakness
TEC09 Poor oil and gas transportation infrastructure Weakness
TEC10 Lack of roads with proper surface and foundation Weakness
TEC11 Insufficient number of ports for oil and gas transportation Weakness
Cultural (7)
CUL01 Common race in the region/pipeline countries Strength
CUL02 Common culture and customs in the region/pipeline countries Strength
CUL03 Common national identity in the region/pipeline countries Strength
CUL04 Common history in the region/pipeline countries Strength
CUL05 Language diversity in the region/pipeline countries Weakness
CUL06 Religion diversity in the region/pipeline countries Weakness
CUL07 Diversity of religious sects in the region/pipeline countries Weakness
Social (5)
SOC01 Open society Opportunity
SOC02 Availability of jobs and public assistance programs Opportunity
In a follow up questionnaire, the participants were asked to
score the factors in each category on a scale from 0 to 1, with a
0.1 increment; where a score of 0 represents non-importance and
a score of 1 indicates extreme importance. Tables 4(a) and
(b) present the importance weight assigned by each DM along
with an average for the five DMs.
‘‘Shorter distance’’ (GEO03), ‘‘political support of the interna-
tional community for the project’’ (POL02) and ‘‘ability to main-
tain and repair current pipelines’’ (TEC01) were perceived as
leading opportunities by the DMs. In contrast, the group con-
sidered ‘‘oil and gas reserve ownership disputes in the region/
pipeline countries’’ (LEG01) and ‘‘danger of terrorism in the
region/pipeline countries’’ (POL04) as the primary potential
threats. While the highest rated strength was ‘‘accessibility and
availability of oil and gas reserves in the region/pipeline coun-
tries’’ (GEO12), and ‘‘traffic obstacles’’ (SOC05) was seen as the
greatest weakness.
Next, the DMs decided to eliminate those factors that they
considered to be relatively unimportant. The DMs agreed to use a
threshold of 0.2 out of a possible 1.0. Eight opportunities, four
threats, eight weaknesses and four strengths had a weight of
0.2 or greater. This resulted in a more manageable number of
factors for the DMs to consider and a balance between the
external and internal factors in the SWOT analysis. The 24
opportunities, strengths, threats and weaknesses are presented
in Table 5 along with their importance weights.
Then, the importance weights presented in Table 5 were
normalized using Eq. (1) and (2) in Appendix 2 to ensure that
the total of the weights for the positive factors (opportunities and
strengths) and the negative factors (threats and weaknesses) each
sum to 1. The normalized weights for the 24 strategic factors are
presented in Table 6.
3.6. Step 6—strategy development
A questionnaire was designed using a Likert scale with
0¼unlikely and 5¼very likely to allow the DMs to evaluate the
likelihood of each of the 24 SWOT factors for each of the
5 alternatives. Higher scores are preferred to lower scores for
the positive factors, those identified as opportunities or strengths.
In contrast, lower scores are preferred to higher scores for the
negative factors, those perceived as threats or weaknesses. Con-
sequently, the ideal and most attainable likelihood score on each
positive factor, any opportunity or strength, is 5. Similarly, the
ideal likelihood score on each negative factor, any threat or
weakness, is 0. The ideal scores for each factor and the average
of the scores assigned by the DMs to each factor for each route are
presented in Table 7.
The average likelihood scores in Table 7 were normalized and
used with the normalized weights in Table 6 to derive an overall
opportunity–strength and an overall threat–weakness score for
each route. Eqs. (3) and (4) in Appendix 2 describe the process.
Then, each of the 5 alternative routes is plotted by its
opportunity–strength and threat–weakness scores in the scatter
diagram depicted in Fig. 3. Observe that the ideal strategy would
have coordinates of (5,0) on the opportunity–strength and threat–
weakness axes of Fig. 3. The Euclidean distance between each
alternative and the ideal route (5,0) is calculated using Eq. (5) in
Appendix 2. Alternative routes with a smaller Euclidean distance
are closer to the ideal route and preferred. These Euclidean
distances are the basis for ranking the alternative routes pre-
sented in Table 8.
As shown in Table 8, the Southern and Northern routes are the
alternatives closest to the ideal route. The gap analysis in this
table reveals that the opportunity–strength score for the Southern
route (2.656) is slightly lower than the score for the Northern
route (2.792) resulting in a smaller opportunity–strength gap
from the opportunity–strength ideal score (5) for the Northern
route (2.208) compared with the opportunity–strength gap for
the Southern route (2.344). However, the threat–weakness score
for the Southern route (2.260) is significantly lower than the
Northern route (2.672) and the other three remaining routes
resulting in the best threat–weakness gap of 2.260 from the
threat–weakness ideal score (0). The Southern route with
the Euclidean distance of 3.256 and the Northern route with the
Euclidean distance of 3.466 were chosen as the best and second-
best options, respectively. The overall ranking of the alternative
routes can be used as the basis for developing a security strategy
if some degree of diversification (more than one route) is needed.
Although the diversification of oil and gas pipeline routes can
greatly reduce risks due to dependence on a particular route, it is
not an energy security ‘silver bullet’ and cannot eliminate the
overall security risk.
Next, the DMs arranged a series of additional face-to-face
meetings to develop a set of strategies for exploiting the 24
critical success factors identified in the SWOT analysis. In three
Table 3 (continued )
Factor Sub-factor SWOT
SOC03 Educated and trained workers Opportunity
SOC04 Familiarity of the society with oil and gas industries Strength
SOC05 Traffic obstacles Weakness
Geographical (13)
GEO01 Accessibility to open sea and oceans Opportunity
GEO02 Suitable beaches with calm waves Opportunity
GEO03 Shorter distance Opportunity
GEO04 Hilly and mountainous terrain Threat
GEO05 Active Earthquake region Threat
GEO06 High temperature and humidity problems Threat
GEO07 Low temperature and icy conditions Threat
GEO08 Desert terrain Threat
GEO09 Swampy terrain Threat
GEO10 Offshore distance Threat
GEO11 Accessibility to straits for passage Threat
GEO12 Accessibility and availability of oil and gas reserves in the region Strength
GEO13 Poor soil condition and quality Weakness
Table 4
Important weights.
Factor Sub-factor Group classification Sub-factor weights Overall weight
DM 1 DM 2 DM 3 DM4 DM 5
(a)
Economical ECN01 Opportunity 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.16
ECN02 Opportunity 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.10
ECN03 Opportunity 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.10
ECN04 Opportunity 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.12
ECN05 Opportunity 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.06
ECN06 Opportunity 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.10
ECN07 Opportunity 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.16
ECN08 Opportunity 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.16
ECN09 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.10
ECN10 Threat 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.22
ECN11 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.10
ECN12 Threat 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.22
ECN13 Threat 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.16
ECN14 Threat 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.12
ECN15 Threat 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.10
ECN16 Strength 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.14
ECN17 Strength 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.08
ECN18 Strength 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.16
ECN19 Strength 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.18
ECN20 Weakness 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.10
ECN21 Weakness 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.14
ECN22 Weakness 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.14
Political POL01 Opportunity 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.42
POL02 Opportunity 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.66
POL03 Threat 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.12
POL04 Threat 0.6 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.60
POL05 Threat 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.04
POL06 Threat 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.10
POL07 Strength 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.42
POL08 Weakness 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.38
POL09 Weakness 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.26
Legal LEG01 Threat 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.00
LEG02 Strength 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.30
LEG03 Weakness 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.34
LEG04 Weakness 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.42
(b)
Environmental ENI01 Threat 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.12
ENI02 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.10
ENI03 Threat 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.10
ENI04 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.12
ENI05 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.12
ENI06 Threat 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.14
ENI07 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.08
ENI08 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.16
Technological TEC01 Opportunity 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.50
TEC02 Opportunity 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.44
TEC03 Opportunity 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.10
TEC04 Strength 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.06
TEC05 Strength 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.08
TEC06 Strength 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.12
TEC07 Strength 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.06
TEC08 Weakness 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.16
TEC09 Weakness 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.30
TEC10 Weakness 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.08
TEC11 Weakness 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.10
Cultural CUL01 Strength 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.14
CUL02 Strength 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.08
CUL03 Strength 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.08
CUL04 Strength 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.06
CUL05 Weakness 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.30
CUL06 Weakness 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.12
CUL07 Weakness 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.18
Social SOC01 Opportunity 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.42
SOC02 Opportunity 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.34
SOC03 Opportunity 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.30
SCC04 Strength 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.58
SOC05 Weakness 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.46
meetings, the DMs proposed 24 strategies corresponding to the
theme in one of the critical SWOT factors. The proposed strategies
are presented in Table 9.
 The opportunity strategies proposed by the DMs were in eight
categories. The most important strategies were improving
political relations with ultra-regional powers, strengthening
the open-door policy, improving political relations with neigh-
boring countries and strengthening the capacity of employ-
ment on oil and gas transportation.
 The proposed threat strategies were categorized into four
groups including preventing further terrorist attacks, more
control over terrorist groups, creating better conditions for
attracting foreign investment and reducing the costs associated
with construction and maintenance of pipelines.
 The strategies related to the strength factors were in four
categories. The highest ranking were providing more accurate
statistics of oil and gas resources in the Caspian coast of Iran
and strengthening the insurance industry.
 The strategies linked to the weakness factors by the DMs were
divided in eight types. The principal strategies were enhancing
the security of pipelines, strengthening the infrastructure of oil
and gas pipelines, ensuring military stability and using other
domestic routes that have better soil quality because of climate
variability in Iran.
The ranking of the strategies in Table 9 reflects the DMs
perception of the importance of the related SWOT factor that
was reported in Table 6. These priorities are essential to the
strategic planning process because the funds and resources
available for implementing the strategies are limited.
4. Conclusions and future research directions
With the increasing demand for energy from emerging econo-
mies, the demand for oil and natural gas has severely challenged
Table 4 (continued )
Factor Sub-factor Group classification Sub-factor weights Overall weight
DM 1 DM 2 DM 3 DM4 DM 5
Geographical GEO01 Opportunity 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.18
GEO02 Opportunity 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.10
GEO03 Opportunity 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.76
GEO04 Threat 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.18
GEO05 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.12
GEO06 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.08
GEO07 Threat 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.12
GEO08 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.08
GEO09 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.08
GEO10 Threat 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.14
GEO11 Threat 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.10
GEO12 Strength 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.72
GEO13 Weakness 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.32
Table 5
Key factors with Overall weightZ0:2.
SWOT Sub-factor Overall weight
Opportunities POL01 0.42
POL02 0.66
TEC01 0.50
TEC02 0.44
SOC01 0.42
SOC02 0.34
SOC03 0.30
GEO03 0.76
Strengths POL07 0.42
LEG02 0.30
SCC04 0.58
GEO12 0.72
Threats ECN10 0.22
ECN12 0.22
POL04 0.60
LEG01 1.00
Weaknesses POL08 0.38
POL09 0.26
LEG03 0.34
LEG04 0.42
TEC09 0.30
CUL05 0.30
SOC05 0.46
GEO13 0.32
Table 6
Key factors and their normalized weights.
SWOT Sub-factor Overall weight
Opportunities POL01 0.072
POL02 0.113
TEC01 0.085
TEC02 0.075
SOC01 0.072
SOC02 0.058
SOC03 0.051
GEO03 0.130
Strengths POL07 0.072
LEG02 0.051
SCC04 0.099
GEO12 0.123
Total weight 1.000
Threats ECN10 0.046
ECN12 0.046
POL04 0.124
LEG01 0.207
Weaknesses POL08 0.079
POL09 0.054
LEG03 0.071
LEG04 0.087
TEC09 0.062
CUL05 0.062
SOC05 0.095
GEO13 0.066
Total weight 1.000
the world supply. In response, pipelines are used to transport oil
and natural gas over long distances within countries and across
borders to meet this increasing demand. The distances between
the source of the petroleum products and the destination for
energy processing can be thousands of miles over difficult terrain.
This is particularly true as more exploration is occurring in
remote areas of the world. In this environment, an increasing
number of foreign and local state-owned companies have started
to evaluate alternative export routes from the Caspian Sea basin
because of its vast potential for oil and natural gas production.
The evaluation of alternative transnational export routes for
oil and natural gas is a complex multi-criteria problem with
conflicting objectives. This study developed a hybrid model
combining SWOT analysis with the Delphi method to assist DMs
at the Horizon Oil Company in evaluating five export routes. The
model decomposed the process into manageable steps and
integrated the results to arrive at a solution that was consistent
with Horizon goals. The decomposition encouraged DMs to think
systematically and consider carefully the elements of uncertainty;
however, the proposed framework does not imply a deterministic
approach to multi-criteria decision making. While the process
enabled DMs at Horizon to identify and assimilate relevant
information and organize their beliefs in a formal systematic
approach, the effectiveness of the model relies heavily on the
DM’s cognitive capabilities. In this application, the evaluation
process exploited the DMs’ experience and knowledge to yield a
rich and balanced range of strategic initiatives covering most of
the factors identified by the DMs as being important. However,
there are factors that need further consideration.
The framework developed in this study can potentially lend
itself to many practical applications. However, there are a number
of challenges involved in the proposed research that provide a
great deal of possibilities for future research. For example, Delphi
and SWOT can separately lead to limitations. However, the hybrid
method leads to a more efficient approach for integrating sub-
jective judgments with complex multi-criteria problems. Can we
estimate a confidence and reliability index? How about the time
factor? How do the continuous and dynamic time factors affect
the results? How do the short, medium and long term considera-
tions influence the model?
After this human intuition centric approach, another perspec-
tive is to develop, on the Southern and Northern routes, a
deterministic method according to a systems modeling process.
This formal extension of the evaluation process should broaden
the initial findings. The result is a complex mathematical model
with mixed discrete and continuous variables based on techno-
logical, physical and economic equation systems. Using compu-
ter-based simulation and optimization methods, the model will
allow us to point out advanced economic analysis, technical
design, or environmental impact estimation. This integration of
a judgmental approach with an analytical process should improve
our analysis and the overall decision process for oil and gas
pipeline planning in Caspian Sea basin.
Table 7
Average likelihood and ideal scores for the 5 DMs and the 5 alternative routes.
SWOT Sub-factor Alternative routes Ideal score
Southern (S) Western (W) Northern (N) Southeastern (SE) Eastern (E)
Opportunities POL01 2.8 3.0 3.2 2.2 2.8 5.0
POL02 2.0 3.0 3.6 2.4 2.8 5.0
TEC01 2.8 2.2 3.2 1.4 1.4 5.0
TEC02 2.6 2.2 3.4 1.4 1.0 5.0
SOC01 2.4 3.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 5.0
SOC02 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.6 5.0
SOC03 3.0 1.4 3.0 1.0 0.8 5.0
GEO03 3.8 1.8 1.8 1.2 1.0 5.0
Strengths POL07 2.0 1.8 2.8 1.0 1.4 5.0
LEG02 2.0 2.0 2.8 1.2 1.2 5.0
SCC04 3.4 2.0 3.0 1.6 1.6 5.0
GEO12 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.6 5.0
Threats ECN10 2.2 3.0 3.0 2.6 2.4 0.0
ECN12 2.4 3.0 3.0 1.8 2.0 0.0
POL04 1.6 2.4 2.4 3.2 2.4 0.0
LEG01 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.8 0.0
Weaknesses POL08 1.6 2.6 2.6 4.0 3.2 0.0
POL09 2.2 2.4 1.4 3.2 3.0 0.0
LEG03 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 0.0
LEG04 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.0 2.0 0.0
TEC09 2.0 2.4 1.6 3.8 3.8 0.0
CUL05 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.6 2.8 0.0
SOC05 2.0 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.4 0.0
GEO13 2.2 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.0 0.0
Fig. 3. Route evaluation scatter chart.
It is hard to say for sure which route is the best, but, we made
the selection process more comprehensive and systematic. The
Hybrid group Delphi-SWOT method used at Horizon was intended
to enhance decision making. Upon completion of the evaluation
and selection process, the group members met to discuss the
results and finalize its recommendations. The five group members
unanimously agreed that the proposed framework provided
invaluable analysis aids and information processing support. They
were convinced that the results were unbiased and consistent
with their goals and objectives.
Although the benefits of our model are still nascent, the
potential is enormous. We stress that our contribution addresses
only the set of issues that were identified by the DMs at the
Horizon Oil Company as relevant to the evaluation of alternative
export routes from the Caspian Sea basin. We hope that our study
can inspire others to pursue further research.
Appendix 1. The dominance concept
Let us assume alternative routes a0 and a00 have likelihood scores
x0 ¼ ðx01,. . .,x
0
p,. . .,x
0
mÞ and x
0 ¼ ðx001,. . .,x
00
p,. . .,x
00
mÞ where xpða
0Þ  x0p and
xpða
00Þ  x00p for p¼ 1,. . .,m. Furthermore, let us assume that prefer-
ences increase in each xp. We say that x0 dominates x00 whenever
x0pZx
00
p ðfor all pÞ and x
0
p4x
00
p ðfor some pÞ. If x
0 dominates x00, then
the alternative route a00 is not a candidate for ‘‘best alternative
route,’’ since a0 is at least as good as a00 for every SWOT factor (given
by x0pZx
00
p), and strictly better for at least one (given by x
0
p4x
00
p).
Note that the idea of dominance exploits only the ordinal character
of the likelihood scores (i.e., given two likelihood scores x0p ¼ 3 and
x00p ¼ 1, we are interested in the relationship that x
0
p4x
00
p) and not
the cardinal character of these likelihood scores (i.e., the fact that
the difference between 5 and 3 is greater than the distance from
3 to 1 or that 3 is three times 1). Also note that dominance does not
require comparisons between x0p and x
00
p for paq.
Appendix 2. Mathematical notations and equations
Let us define:
m number of key positive factors
n number of key negative factors
Xi score of the key positive factor i
Yj score of the key negative factor j
~X i normalized score of the key positive factor i
~Y j normalized score of the key negative factor j
Ki average likelihood of the key positive factor i
Lj average likelihood of the key negative factor j
Wos overall opportunity–strength score for each route
Wtw overall threat–weakness score for each route
D overall distance of each route from the ideal route
Table 8
Route evaluation results.
Route Opportunity–
strength score
Threat–
weakness score
Euclidean
distance
Ranking Opportunity–
strength gap
Threat–
weakness gap
Southern (S) 2.656 2.260 3.256 1 2.344 2.260
Western (W) 2.242 2.760 3.902 3 2.758 2.760
Northern (N) 2.792 2.672 3.466 2 2.208 2.672
Southeastern (SE) 1.715 2.990 4.442 5 3.285 2.990
Eastern (E) 1.815 2.871 4.288 4 3.185 2.871
Ideal score 5.000 0.000
Table 9
Key strategies.
Rank Strategies Remarks
1 To improve political relations with ultra-regional powers To take advantage of the POL02 opportunity
2 To prevent further terrorist attacks To overcome the POL04 threat
3 To enhance the security of pipelines To reduce the POL08 weakness
4 To provide more accurate statistics of oil and gas resources in the Caspian coast of Iran To increase the GEO12 strength
5 To strengthen the infrastructure of oil and gas pipelines To reduce the TEC09 weakness
6 To ensure military stability To reduce the POL09 weakness
7 To use other domestic routes that have better soil quality due to climate variability in Iran To reduce the GEO13 weakness
8 To create better conditions for attracting foreign investment To overcome the threat LEG01
9 To strengthen the open-door policy To take advantage of the SOC01 opportunity
10 To remedy the restrict regulations relating to export and import To reduce the LEG03 weakness
11 To create the infrastructure for solving traffic problems in transportations To reduce the SOC05 weakness
12 To remedy the restrict regulations for further foreign investment To reduce the LEG04 weakness
13 To improve political relations with neighboring countries To take advantage of the POL01 opportunity
14 To reduce the costs associated with the construction and repair of pipelines To overcome the ECN10 threat
15 To promote common language with the Caspian regional countries To reduce the CUL05 weakness
16 To strengthen the insurance industry To increase the LEG02 strength
17 To reduce the costs associated with the transportation of pipelines To overcome the ECN12 threat
18 To strengthen political stability To increase the POL07 strength
19 To strengthen the capacity of employment on oil and gas transportation To take advantage of the SOC02 opportunity
20 To expand pipelines To take advantage of the TEC02 opportunity
21 To strengthen the maintenance capabilities of the pipelines To take advantage of the TEC01 opportunity
22 To train the personnel on oil and gas transportation To take advantage of the SOC03 opportunity
23 To familiarize people with oil and gas transportation lines using mass media To increase the SOC04 strength
24 To introduce transportation routes with more detailed and factual information To take advantage of the GEO03 opportunity
We first normalize the positive (opportunity and strength)
scores using the following normalization process:
~X i ¼
XiPm
i ¼ 1 Xi
ði¼ 1,. . .,mÞ ð1Þ
Similarly, we normalize the negative (threat and weakness)
scores using the following normalization process:
~Y j ¼
Y jPn
j ¼ 1 Y j
ðj¼ 1,. . .,nÞ ð2Þ
We then calculate the overall opportunity–strength score for
each alternative route as below:
Wos ¼
Xm
i ¼ 1
~X i  K i ð3Þ
Similarly, the overall threat–weakness score for each alter-
native route is obtained from the following equation:
W tw ¼
Xn
j ¼ 1
~Y j  Lj ð4Þ
Finally, we calculate the overall distance of each alternative
route from the ideal route (5,0) as
D¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
ðWosÿ5Þ
2þðW twÿ0Þ
2
q
ð5Þ
The Euclidean distances are used to rank the alternative
routes. The alternatives closer to the ideal route are preferred to
those farther away from the ideal route.
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